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PROPERTY-COMMUNITY PROPERTY AND JOINT TENANCY: CREATING

SURVIVORSMP RIGHTS IN WASHINGTON-In

re Estate of Olson, 87 Wn.

2d 855, 577 P.2d 302 (1976).
In 1967, Victor Olson lent $55,000 to Dorothy Linn from the
community property of Victor and Georgie Olson. The loan was evidenced by a mortgage and note, each naming the Olsons as joint tenants with rights of survivorship.1 Georgie Olson took no part in the
transaction. She knew that a loan had been made but was unaware of
its terms. When Victor Olson died on November 4, 1973, a balance
of $31,528.11 remained on the loan. Georgie Olson first learned that
the note was in joint tenancy form in conjunction with the administration of Victor Olson's estate. She then claimed the full balance from
Dorothy Linn by virtue of her survivorship. Less than one month
later, Georgie died.
In 1972, Victor Olson had executed a will giving Dorothy Linn
"the remaining balance [on the note], if any, owing by her to me at
the time of my death."'2 Victor's executor requested a declaratory ruling that the obligation was an asset of Victor's estate. The trial court
found to the contrary, that the note and mortgage were held in joint
tenancy with rights of survivorship and thus were an asset in Georgie
Olson's estate.
The Washington Supreme Court reversed. The court stated that
"until the passage of Initiative 208 in 1960, the form of joint ownership of property known as joint tenancy with right of survivorship was
not recognized in this state."'3 It read the Initiative, as amended in
1963, 4 to require "some clear indication by the marital community
that the property subject to joint tenancy is intended by [the community members] to be held as such." 5 The court found no evidence of
such intent except the promise of a third party, Dorothy Linn, to
1.

In re Estate of Olson, 87 Wn. 2d 855, 858 n.3, 557 P.2d 302, 304 n.3 (1976)

(complete text of promissory note).
2. Id. at 856 n.l, 557 P.2d at 303 n.1.
3.

Id. at 857, 557 P.2d at 303. Initiative 208 was enacted by a vote of the people

at the November 1960 general election. Act Authorizing Joint Tenancies in Property,
ch. 2, 1961 Wash. Laws 26 (current version at WASH. REV. CODE. ch. 64.28 (1976)),
quoted in part at note 18 infra. Henceforth, this statute will be referred to as'Initiative

208 or as the Initiative.
4. Act of Apr. 18, 1963, ch. 16, § 1, 1963 Wash. Laws Ex. Sess. 1387 (codified at
WASH. REV. CODE § 64.28.010 (1976)).
5. In re Estate of Olson, 87 Wn. 2d 855, 859, 557 P.2d 302, 305 (1976).
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make payments to the Olsons as joint tenants. This promise was held
to be insufficient; consequently, the asset remained community property. In re Estate of Olson, 87 Wn. 2d 855, 577 P.2d 302 (1976).
This note presents two analyses of the Olson decision. Under the
first analysis, the amended Initiative is interpreted to require a writing
executed by the marital community in order to convert property from
community to joint tenancy ownership. It is argued that this interpretation is unreasonable and will produce an unsatisfactory result in
some cases. The second analysis is based on community property law:
both spouses must participate in the change of ownership because the
property rights of both are affected. This reasoning better supports
the Olson decision. It was incompletely developed in the opinion,
however, because the court did not squarely decide whether the required participation should be limited to a single joint act of creation.
This note argues that a joint tenancy purportedly created by the action of one spouse may be perfected by the other spouse's independent
acts of participation unless the acting spouse has effectively repudiated the attempted creation.
I.
A.

JOINT TENANCY IN WASHINGTON
Before Initiative 208

Prior to the passage of Initiative 208, the right of survivorship as
an automatic incident of joint tenancy ownership had been abolished
by statute. 6 Nevertheless, the Washington Supreme Court held in In
re Estate of Ivers7 that a husband and wife could create a right of survivorship in a joint bank account by express agreement. 8 The court
subsequently required a "clear showing of intent" to create a joint tenancy if the funds deposited had originally been community property. 9
6. Act of Dec. 23, 1885, § 1, 1885 Wash. Terr. Laws 165, as amended by Act of
Mar. 23, 1953, ch. 270, 1953 Wash. Laws 717.
7. 4 Wn. 2d 477, 104 P.2d 467 (1940).
8. Id. at 487, 104 P.2d at 472. In Ivers, community property was deposited in a
bank account. Each spouse signed a deposit agreement which provided that "'[d]eposits entered herein are payable to either F. Ivers or Mrs. F. Ivers, or the survivor,
and in case of the temporary closing, . . . a deposit thereafter by either is to be payable to either or the survivor ....
' Id. at 480, 104 P.2d at 469. The deposit agreement was the only evidence in the record showing intent to create a right of survivorship.
9. Tacoma Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Nadham, 14 Wn.2d 576, 128 P.2d 982 (1942).
In Nadham, the court recognized that survivorship rights could be created "if the
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For a time, statutes authorizing various depository institutions to
pay the funds in a joint account to the surviving tenant changed the
court's treatment of survivorship rights.' 0 Initially, such statutes were
held to establish survivorship as an incident attaching automatically

to joint tenancy ownership of savings and loan accounts,' 1 irrespec-

tive of the intent of the tenants or the community nature of the funds
deposited.' 2 The court abandoned this approach in Munson v.
Haye,'3 stating that the savings and loan statute was "intended priparties intend, and clearly express their intention, to create such complete relationship"
but went on to say,
In the instant case, ... the evidence [does not] establish an intention to create
a relationship having that feature. The savings account was opened by merely
signing a printed form of subscription for one or more shares in the Tacoma
Savings and Loan Association .... [T] he authority conferred by the subscription
card was simply for the purpose of protecting the association ....
Id. at 588, 128 P.2d at 988. The theory that provisions are merely to protect the institution played a significant part in later statutory analysis. See note 14 and accompanying text infra.
10. The relevant statutes for joint depository accounts, as originally enacted and as
presently codified, are Act of Feb. 19, 1951, ch. 18, § 1, 1951 Wash. Laws 36 (current
version at WASH. REV. CODE § 30.20.015 (1976)) (banks); Act of Mar. 20, 1933,
ch. 173, § 10, 1933 Wash. Laws 660 (current version at WASH. REV. CODE § 31.12.140
(1976)) (credit unions); Act of Mar. 20, 1929, ch. 123, § 2, 1929 Wash. Laws 279
(current version at WASH. REV. CODE § 32.12.030 (1976)) (mutual savings institutions); Act of Mar. 20, 1933, ch. 183, § 41, 1933 Wash. Laws 711 (current version
at WASH. REV. CODE § 33.20.030 (1976)) (savings and loan institutions). Although
the language varies, the thrust of each statute is and has been to enable the institutions to make payments to the survivors and not to empower the survivors to demand
payment.
11. See cases discussed at note 12 infra. The statutes speak in terms ofjoint tenancy
ownership and the court has consistently treated the problem as whether a full joint
tenancy is created. The exact status of joint ownership of depository accounts is unclear. The joint tenancy concept of an undivided partial interest in the whole, which
was 'developed in the context of real property, is difficult to apply to funds in a joint
account because there is no clear distinction between enjoyment and ouster when the
joint tenancy property is money. Nevertheless, the right of survivorship rather than
the inter vivos nature of the interest is the principal focus of attention, both in this
note and in the general discussion ofjoint accounts. See, e.g., Cross, Joint Tenancy for
Washington?, 35 WASH. L. REV. 292, 293 (1960). The analysis of this point is not
affected by the peculiar nature ofjoint depository accounts.
12. In re Estate of Peterson, 182 Wash. 29, 45 P.2d 45 (1935) (savings account
in a mutual savings bank). In Peterson, the sole evidence establishing survivorship
was the form contract between the savings bank and the married couple which stated,
"'Withdrawals from this account may be made by either of us, during the lifetime of
both, or by the survivor upon death of one of us.'" Id. at 31, 45 P.2d at 46. These
words fit the form prescribed by the statute and the survivor was held to take the
account free of inheritance taxes, without any showing of intent to hold as joint
tenants. Another case, Nelson v. Olympia Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 193 Wash. 222, 74
P.2d 1019 (1938), dealt with savings and loan accounts. Mrs. Nelson became the
joint tenant of an account which had formerly been the separate property of Mr. Larson. Because the formalities required by statute for the formation of a joint tenancy
were met, Mrs. Nelson became the sole owner on Mr. Larson's death. The court, in
Nelson, relied on Petersoneven though the former did not involve community property.
13. 29 Wn. 2d 733, 189 P.2d 464 (1948). In Munson, the married couple deposited
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marily for the protection of the institution" and not to create rights
between joint depositors.' 4 The Munson court granted that a presumption of intent to create a joint tenancy, could arise from the form
of the account' 5 but went on to hold that the "presumption was met
and destroyed when proof was presented that the funds deposited
were community property."' 16 Thus, "clear, certain, and convincing"
proof of intent was required to convert community property into
17
property held in joint tenancy.
B.

The Effect of Initiative 208

Initiative 208 was enacted in 1960, establishing survivorship as an
automatic incident of joint tenancy ownership.' 8 Survivorship was
held out to the voters as a means of having one's "estate pass right
down the family tree without attorney fees or court costs." 19 In 1963,
community funds in a joint account. The wife withdrew the funds and opened a joint
account between herself and a third party. The wife died thereafter and the third
party withdrew the funds. The husband successfully sued to regain them.
14. Id. at 740, 189 P.2d at 468. The court reasoned that establishing a joint tenancy with survivorship rights involved two transactions-one between the individual
depositors and the other between the depositors and the institution. The statute made
the form of the account conclusive only between the depositors and the institution.
Between themselves, the depositors were required to demonstrate actual intent to create
survivorship rights.
15. Id. at 743, 189 P.2d at 470. It is unclear whether the court viewed the presumption as a statutory creation or as arising independently from the signing of the card.
The tenor of the decision suggests that it arises independently. Otherwise, the court
must be understood to have said that the statute created conclusive rights between the
depositors and the institution and limited rights between the depositors. This would
not be a reasonable position because it contradicts the major premise that the statute
was created only to protect the institution. Actually, the language in the Munson opinion is grudging: "The very strongest position that respondents can contend for is that
a presumption arose .
Id. After Munson, however, such a presumption was
consistently recognized.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 744, 189 P.2d at 470.
18. Act Authorizing Joint Tenancies in Property, ch. 2, 1961 Wash. Laws 26 (current version at WASH. REV. CODE ch. 64.28 (1976)). The Initiative provided in pertinent part:
Whereas joint tenancy with right of survivorship permits property to pass to the
survivor without the cost or delay of probate proceedings, there shall be a form
of co-ownership of property, real and personal, known as joint tenancy. A joint
tenancy shall have the incidents of survivorship and severability as at common
law. Joint tenancy may be created by written agreement, written transfer, deed,
will or other instrument of conveyance, when expressly declared therein to be a
joint tenancy, or when granted or devised to executors or trustees as joint tenants ....

Id.§ I.
19. SECRETARY OF STATE, STATE OF WASHINGTON, OFFICIAL VOTERS' PAMPHLET 12
(1960).
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the Initiative was amended. 20 Property owners were expressly allowed
to create a joint tenancy by transferring property, including community property from a husband and wife, to themselves as joint tenants.
The amendment unequivocally required that the transfer be made in a
written document. 2 '
Olson was the first supreme court decision to construe the amended
version of Initiative 208.22 However, one appellate case, Rogers
Walla Walla, Inc. v. Ballard,2 3 concerned an attempt to convert community property into property held in joint tenancy. 24 The Rogers
court treated the Initiative as the depository institution statutes had

20. Act of Apr. 18, 1963, ch. 16, § 1, 1963 Wash. Laws Ex. Sess. 1387 (codified
at WASH. REV. CODE § 64.28.010 (1976)).
21. The original language was justifiably assumed to require creation in writing.
See Cross, supra note 11, at 295. The amended Initiative provides,
Whereas joint tenancy with right of survivorship permits property to pass to the
survivor without the cost or delay of probate proceedings, there shall be a form of
co-ownership of property, real and personal, known as joint tenancy. A joint
tenancy shall have the incidents of survivorship and severability as at common
law. Joint tenancy shall be created only by written instrument, which instrument
shall expressly declare the interest created to be a joint tenancy. It may be created
by a single agreement, transfer, deed, will, or other instrument of conveyance, or
by agreement, transfer, deed or other instrument from a sole owner to himself
and others, or from tenants in common or joint tenants to themselves or some of
them, or to themselves or any of them and others, or from husband and wife,
when holding title as community property, or otherwise, to themselves and others,
or to one of them and to another or others, or when granted or devised to executors or trustees as joint tenants ....
WASH. REV. CODE § 64.28.010 (1976) (emphasis indicates significant changes or additions).
22. The significant cases are appellate court decisions. In Reilly v. Sageser, 2 Wn.
App. 6, 467 P.2d 358 (1970), a quitclaim deed from one married couple to themselves and another couple as "joint tenants with the right of survivorship and not as
tenants in common'" was held to create a joint tenancy with right of survivorship
between the two couples. Id. at 6, 467 P.2d at 360. The court in In re Estate of Patton,
6 Wn. App. 464, 494 P.2d 238 (1972), held that a husband's unilateral attempt to
convert community property to a joint tenancy between himself and his children by a
former marriage was invalid because the statute required both members of the marital
community to join in the creation of a joint tenancy. In In re Estate of Bonness, 13
Wn. App. 299, 535 P.2d 823 (1975), the court declared that the Initiative expressed
the modern policy favoring the avoidance of probate administration through the use
ofjoint tenancy survivorship rights.
23. 16 Wn. App. 81, 553 P.2d 1372 (1976).
24. In Rogers, a husband and wife purchased 100 shares of stock with the express
understanding that, should the husband leave the company's employ, the shares would
be resold to the company. The agreement to resell had been signed only by the husband at the time he purchased the original shares. The shares were held as community
property. Eventually, Rogers Walla Walla merged with another company and the 100
shares were called in and replaced by 2,400 shares of new stock issued to the husband
and wife as joint tenants. The husband subsequently resigned and the wife argued
that she, as a joint tenant, could not be forced to resell her interest in the stock. Neither
of the Olson briefs cited Rogers.
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been treated 25 and ruled that nominal title to property in joint tenancy
created only a presumption of ownership in that form. Proof that
property held formally in joint tenancy had originally been community property rebutted the presumption.2 6 The Rogers court, finding
no clear, certain, and convincing evidence of intent to convert to joint
tenancy ownership, held that the property was still owned by the mar27
ital community.
II.

THE OLSON OPINION: STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION

A.

The Court's Reasoning

The Olson court began with the inaccurate premise that, prior to
the passage of Initiative 208, joint tenancies had not been recognized
in Washington.2 8 The court next examined the narrow grounds upon
25. See notes 10-17 and accompanying text supra.
26. The Rogers opinion ignored a basic difference between the depository institution statutes and Initiative 208. The Munson court had adequate grounds to conclude
that the former were intended only to protect the institutions. The statutes were originally proposed by the institutions, and they do not expressly give the survivor legal
title to the property. Instead, they allow payment of funds to the survivor. The relevant statutory language is set out in Munson, 29 Wn. 2d at 739-40, 189 P.2d at 468.
The Initiative, however, was intended precisely to authorize the creation of survivorship rights between individuals. The Munson court's treatment of the depository institution statutes cannot legitimately be applied to Initiative 208.
27. Other community property states have dealt variously with the problem of converting from community to joint tenancy ownership. Arizona requires clear proof of
intent to hold in joint tenancy but will allow extrinsic evidence to prove intent even if
the document is silent on the subject. Safley v. Bates, 26 Ariz. App. 318, 548 P.2d 31
(1976). New Mexico, by statute, makes the form of ownership prima facie evidence
of intent to hold as joint tenants, N.M. STAT. ANN. § 70-1-14.1 (1961), but actual
intent, if proved, will govern. Wiggins v. Rush, 83 N.M. 133, 489 P.2d 641 (1971).
In Texas, married couples are required by the state constitution to sever community
property into separate property before a joint tenancy can be formed. Williams v. McKnight, 402 S.W.2d 505 (Tex. 1966). See generally Annot., 30 A.L.R.2d 1241 (1953).
In California, a blending of community property and joint tenancy forms of ownership has occurred. Rather than insist that property held formally in joint tenancy is
actually community property, the California court selectively carries over some incidents of community ownership when doing so will give effect to the intent and expectations of the husband and wife. See Griffith, Community Property in Joint Tenancy
Form, 14 STAN. L. REV. 87 (1961). Although the incident of survivorship is the primary attraction of joint tenancy ownership, the California court customarily allows
each spouse to dispose of half the joint tenancy property by will. Id. at 93. A hybrid
form of ownership is probably not possible in Washington within the scope of the
Initiative, which provides that joint tenancies shall have the incidents of survivorship
and severability as at common law.
28. 87 Wn. 2d at 858, 557 P.2d at 303. Joint tenancies with rights of survivorship,
if created by express agreement, were permitted prior to the passage of Initiative 208.
See note 8 and accompanying text supra.
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which this "long disfavored form of joint ownership was to be permitted,"'29 emphasizing the effect of the legislative amendment of 1963.30
The court held that the amended Initiative required a written instrument of creation expressly declaring the interest to be a joint tenancy. Furthermore, because the amendment specifically allows certain
categories of property owners, including a husband -and wife, to create a joint tenancy by transferring property to themselves, the court
found that such reflexive transfers3 1 are the usual means of creation.
The court's position that reflexive transfers are the usual means of
creation is bolstered by its characterization of the loan transaction as
a transfer from the Olsons to themselves. 32 The court must have reasoned that because community funds were lent, community funds created the asset represented by the note, therefore the asset was community property. Dorothy Linn was treated merely as a conduit through
33
which community property passed.
The critical question for the court was whether "Victor and
Georgie Ethel Olson intended the community property represented by
the promissory note to be held in joint tenancy."M The court apparently reasoned that the writing required by the Initiative had to be executed by the Olsons because the transfer was essentially from the 01sons to themselves. The language in the note was found not to express
the Olson's intent because the note was executed by Dorothy Linn.
The asset remained community property because "there was no writing by the marital community expressly declaring the interest created
to be a joint tenancy." 35

29. 87 Wn. 2d at 858, 557 P.2d at 303.
30. Id. See Act of Apr. 18, 1963, ch. 16, § 1, 1963 Wash. Laws Ex. Sess. 1387
(codified at WASH. REV. CODE § 64.28.010 (1976)), quoted at note 21 supra.

3 1. The term reflexive transfer is used to denote a transfer from property owners
to themselves.
32. See 85 Wn. 2d at 858-59, 557 P.2d at 303. The loan transaction could instead
be regarded as the purchase of an interest-bearing note. See note 42 infra.
33. Under this reasoning, only a gratuitous conveyance would not be characterized
as a transfer from a husband and wife to themselves because, in that instance, community property would not be exchanged. In In re Estate of Green, 46 Wn. 2d 637, 283
P.2d 989 (1955), the court allowed an owner gratuitously to create a joint tenancy
between herself and third parties who knew nothing of the transaction. Although the
transferees in Green were not spouses, it should be equally possible for a third party
gratuitously to create a joint tenancy in a conveyance to a husband and wife without
their express written intent to hold as joint tenants.
34. 87 Wn. 2d at 859, 557 P.2d at 305.
35. Id. at 859-60, 557 P.2d at 305.
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B.

Analysis of the Statutory Interpretation

The suggestion that the 1963 amendment to Initiative 208 assumes
that joint tenancies are usually created by a transfer from property
owners to themselves is unpersuasive and erroneously implies that the
amendatory language is the operative portion of the statute. The Ini-

tiative, as originally enacted, provided that a joint tenancy may be
created by any instrument of conveyance expressly declaring the in-

terest to be a joint tenancy. 3 6 In 1963, the Initiative was amended expressly to allow creation in a written transfer from an owner or owners to himself, herself, or themselves

and others. 37 The most

reasonable interpretation is that the amendment was intended to allow
creation of a joint tenancy in a reflexive transfer without an intervening conveyance to a "straw man" as required at common law. 38 The
original version of the Initiative allowed creation of a joint tenancy by

a single transfer from a third person. The amendment did not invali39
date this method of creation.

Characterizing the loan transaction as a transfer from the Olsons to
themselves allowed the court to conclude that the Olsons were required to have executed the writing. 40 When a conveyance is truly
from the owners to themselves, the writing must necessarily be exe-

cuted by them. However, when in the normal course of a transaction
the written instrument is executed by a third party, the intent of the
owners to have the instrument stand as the written expression of the
transaction should be sufficient to satisfy the Initiative's requirement
41
of creation by a writing.

36. See note 18 supra.
37. See note 21 supra.
38. Professor Cross, prior to the enactment of this amendment, raised some doubt
that a joint tenancy could be created by conveyance directly from owners to themselves. See Cross, supra note 11, at 296. See also Lyness, Conveyance or Transfers of
Property Interests by One Spouse to the Other, in WASHINGTON COMMUNITY PROPERTY
DESK BOOK § 17.13 (1977) (concerning the effect of the amendment).
39. The dissent in Olson argued convincingly that the amendment did not significantly change the Initiative and that a writing from a third party transferee is sufficient
under the original language. 87 Wn. 2d at 860-64, 557 P.2d at 305-07 (Hale, J.,
dissenting).
40. Such a position flows logically from the Olson court's interpretation of the
Initiative. If this interpretation is correct, the Initiative changed nothing because, prior
to its adoption, parties could form a joint tenancy by express contract. See notes 6-8
and accompanying text supra. It is difficult to believe that the legislature enacted a
purposeless amendment. See 87 Wn. 2d at 863, 557 P.2d at 307 (Hale, J., dissenting).
41. Written proof of intent to have the writing stand as a memorial should not be
required. The Initiative requires only that the creating instrument be written, not that
the joint tenants execute a written document. Indeed, the basic scheme of the Initiative
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The Olson court's declaration that the note and mortgage represented only the intent of Dorothy Linn is untenable. A note is the
product of bargaining between creditor and debtor. 42 The fact that
the creditor is willing to loan money on the terms set forth in a note
demonstrates his or her intent to make those terms binding. It is not
significant that the debtor alone executes and signs the note and mortgage. Requiring formalities beyond those present in a valid instrument
of conveyance not only is contrary to the legislative intent, but would

defeat many apparent joint tenancies and perhaps cause hardship for

43
those who justifiably rely on their validity.

III.

A PREFERRED INTERPRETATION: COMMUNITY
PROPERTY ANALYSIS

A.

The Court's Reasoning

The language of the Olson opinion will support another, more
satisractory analysis which focuses on the transformation of'the
spouses' property rights. 44 Initiative 208 provides that a joint tenancy
shall have the incidents of severability and survivorship as at common
allows creation in a single document of conveyance from a third party owner to the
joint tenants. A document of conveyance is not customarily signed by the transferee
and there is no hint in the Initiative that a different practice should be followed to
create a joint tenancy. Nevertheless, written evidence of intent will be available when
joinder is required to complete the underlying transaction. Other kinds of evidence
may also show the necessary intent. See note 54 infra (authorization).
42. In Olson, the note and mortgage were drawn by Victor Olson's attorney. Brief
of Appellant at 2. The note also bore seven percent interest. On the facts of Olson, it is
wrong to say that the note and mortgage represented only the intent of Dorothy Linn.
43. In Olson, the creation of the joint tenancy was inadequate even though guided
by an attorney. Assuming that Victor Olson's attorney followed a common practice,
one result of the decision could be the widespread failure of apparent joint tenancies.
See notes 50-52 and accompanying text infra.
The court's statutory analysis is also unsatisfactory because logically it would apply
to the creation of joint tenancies by a "sole owner .... tenants in common or joint
tenants" as well as to their creation by husbands and wives. WASH. REv. CODE §
64.28.010 (1976).
44. The court did not clearly delineate the two lines of analysis discussed in this
note. Therefore, it is difficult to determine which was intended or whether the court
relied on both. The most natural reading of the case indicates that the decision was
intended to rest on statutory interpretation, and the dissent clearly reads it to do so.
87 Wn. 2d at 860, 557 P.2d at 305 (Hale, J., dissenting). Lack of any reference to
the public policy favoring community property makes it less likely that the court was
setting forth an analysis based on property interests. However, the statutory interpretation suggested in the opinion rests on inaccurate reasoning and may lead to unjust
results. The court should not be understood to have rested its decision on this ground
when the language of the opinion will support a more satisfactory analysis.
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law. While both tenants are living, either may alienate half of the
property but neither has any testamentary control. 4 5 In general, the
consequences of community ownership are exactly the opposite.
Community property may not be converted into the separate property
of one spouse without express agreement from the other, but each
spouse has a right to dispose of half the property by will.46

Converting community property into property held in joint tenancy
involves a transfer or conveyance of community property rights from
each spouse to the other. 47 The consent of each spouse is required,
not because the Initiative demands it, but because the property rights
of each spouse are affected. This analysis is consistent with the Olson
court's declaration that "[a] joint tenancy cannot be created within
the purview of the statute in the absence of at least some clear indication by the marital community that the property subject to joint tenancy is intended by them to be held as such." 48 The note and mort-

gage naming Victor and Georgie Olson as joint tenants did not
indicate the intent of the marital community to hold the property as
joint tenants because it was drawn in joint tenancy form by Victor's
attorney without Georgie's knowledge or consent.
B.

Analysis: Perfection of the Tenancy Through Participation

The crucial inquiry for a court utilizing this community property
analysis is whether both spouses consented to a conversion from com45. Though the court does not expressly declare its hostility to joint tenancies, the
tone of the Olson opinion indicates disfavor. Perhaps one of the court's concerns is
that property held in joint tenancy is severable and can therefore be converted into
separate property by the unilateral action of either spouse. Increased use of joint tenancies may be viewed as a threat to Washington's community property system. See
notes 61-65 and accompanying text infra.
46. See WASH. REV. CODE §§ 26.16.030, .050 (1976) (control during the lives of
both spouses); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 11.02.070, .04.015 (1976) (disposition at the
death of one spouse).
47. The required form of transfer or conveyance is governed by the Statute of
Frauds. See Cross, The Community Property Law in Washington, 49 WASH. L. REV.
729, 806 (1974); Lyness, supra note 38, § 17.3. The Initiative, however, requires some
form of written instrument. If the Statute of Frauds alone applied, an oral transfer
agreement would sometimes be adequate to create a joint tenancy in personalty.
48. 87 Wn. 2d at 859, 557 P.2d at 305. There is only slight basis for this standard.
The court cited In re Estate of Patton, 6 Wn. App. 464, 481, 494 P.2d 238, 248
(1972), but that case concerned the attempt by one spouse to use community funds to
create a joint tenancy with third parties without the consent of the other spouse. See
note 22 supra. The court also relied on Cross, supra note 47, at 794, 817. Professor
Cross seems to read the Initiative as requiring "joinder" by both spouses, but does not
preclude the possibility that " 'participation' might be sufficient." Id. at 794. See notes
54-57 and accompanying text infra.
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munity to joint tenancy ownership. Consent could be proved by a
writing either executed or signed by both spouses, or by other evidence demonstrating the intent of both spouses to have the writing
stand as the memorial of the completed transaction. 49 Requiring the
consent of both spouses, however, should not mean that both must
take part in a single act of creation. The nonacting spouse should be
allowed to perfect a joint tenancy purportedly created by one spouse
acting alone unless and until the acting spouse has effectively repudiated the attempted creation.
Without a right in the nonacting spouse to perfect the purported
joint tenancy by participation, serious injustice could result. In nearly
every instance, the spouse purporting to create a joint tenancy by unilateral action intends to establish a right of survivorship in favor of
the other spouse, and the form of title should create a presumption of
such intent.5 0 An acting spouse who believes that the joint tenancy is
valid would naturally assume that the other spouse enjoys survivor51
ship rights and adjust his or her testamentary scheme accordingly. If
the acting spouse dies first, leaving a will with a residuary clause, and
the joint tenancy subsequently is held invalid, the residuary taker will
receive the acting spouse's half of the community property. Voiding a
joint tenancy purportedly created by the act of one spouse could thus
do violence to the testamentary intent of the acting spouse and cause
hardship for the survivor. 52 Therefore, the court should recognize a
49.
50.

See notes 42-43 and accompanying text supra.
The alternative is to ignore the joint tenancy form of ownership and look for

actual intent in every case. This would only foster litigation and create uncertainty.
Even prior to the enactment of the Initiative, the court in Munson v. Haye, 29 Wn.
2d 733, 189 P.2d 464 (1948), recognized a presumption of intent from the form of

ownership.
51.

In the usual case, the acting spouse would believe that the joint tenancy was

valid. In Olson, Victor Olson bequeathed his share of the asset to Dorothy Linn.
Counsel for Appellant argued that Victor Olson never intended to create a joint tenancy, was confused as to the nature of a joint tenancy, or was forgetful of his earlier
action. Brief of Appellant at 16. The language of the will is not absolutely inconsistent

with a belief in the validity of the joint tenancy. The testamentary provision could
have been read to apply only if Victor Olson survived his wife or if the couple died
simultaneously. The language of the will bequeathed to Dorothy Linn "the remaining
balance [on the note] if any owing by her to me at the time of my death." 87 Wn. 2d
at 856 n.l, 557 P.2d at 303 n.1. If the right of survivorship were valid and if Victor
Olson died first, there would simply be nothing owing to him. However, asiuming that

Victor Olson did intend to bequeath half of the obligation to Dorothy Linn, the tenancy
should fail, not because he originally lacked intent to create a joint tenancy, but because he later repudiated the tenancy through the testamentary provision.
52.

If there were no residuary clause, the surviving spouse would take all the

community property under Washington's law of intestate succession. WASH. REV. CODE
§ 11.04.015 (1976).
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right in the nonacting spouse to perfect a purported joint tenancy, unless there is a significant countervailing consideration.
Washington's community property scheme is not inconsistent with
such a right of perfection. For example, in an analogous situation,
when joinder of both spouses is required to sell community real property,5 3 a contract executed by one spouse alone may be perfected by
the contemporary authorization or subsequent ratification of the nonjoining spouse. 54 The requirement that both spouses join in the transaction is designed to prevent one spouse from impairing the interests
of the other. Failure of either spouse to join makes the transaction
voidable, but not void. 55 A third party cannot avoid performance of a
contract made with one spouse alone until joinder is requested and
the nonjoining spouse refuses to join. 56 Thus, the nonjoining spouse
may either assert the invalidity of the transaction or perfect it through
57
subsequent participation.
In the joint tenancy context, the nonacting spouse will be completely protected if he or she is granted a similar right to perfect or invalidate a purported joint tenancy. Granting such a right will not increase the risk that the acting spouse might impair the community
property rights of the nonacting spouse. If the joint tenancy is not per53. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.16.030(3) (1976). Joinder is also required to give
community property, id. § 26.16.030(2), to sell or encumber community household
goods, furnishings, or appliances, id. § 26.16.030(5), and to acquire, purchase, sell,
convey, or encumber community business assets unless only one spouse customarily
manages the business, id. § 26.16.030(6).
54. Fundamentally, these equitable substitutes for joinder establish "participation"
by the nonjoining spouse through acts and circumstances independent of the execution
of the agreement. When one spouse knows of the transaction, and actively fosters it
or otherwise demonstrates approval, he or she will be deemed to have joined in the
transaction under the theory of authorization. Whiting v. Johnson, 64 Wn. 2d 135,
390 P.2d 985 (1964). See Konnerup v. Frandsen, 8 Wash. 551, 36 P. 493 (1894).
When one spouse knowingly accepts part performance of the transaction, he or she
will be deemed to have joined under the theory of ratification. In re Horse Heaven
Irrigation Dist., 19 Wn. 2d 89, 141 P.2d 400 (1943). See Tombari v. Griepp, 55 Wn. 2d
771, 350 P.2d 452 (1960). Professor Cross considers both situations to be examples of
"participation." Cross, supra note 47, at 785-87. When both members of the community
know the terms of the transaction and the third party relies on its validity, the nonjoining spouse is estopped from challenging it. Sander v. Wells, 71 Wn. 2d 25, 426
P.2d 481 (1967); Campbell v. Webber, 29 Wn. 2d 516, 188 P.2d 130 (1947).
55. Cross, supra note 47, at 786.
56. Stabbert v. Atlas Imperial Diesel Engine Co., 39 Wn. 2d 789, 238 P.2d 1212
(1951) (validity of lease agreement for community real estate not defeated because
wife did not join). See Colcord v. Leddy, 4 Wash. 791, 31 P. 320 (1892) (contract
for sale of community realty may not be rescinded by purchaser because vendor's
spouse did not join).
57. Colcord v. Leddy, 4 Wash. 791, 31 P. 320 (1892).
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fected during the lives of both spouses, then the property will not be
legally severable.
It will be both unlawful and extremely difficult under Washington's
community property scheme for one spouse acting alone even to purport to create a joint tenancy in real estate or limited types of person58
alty because joinder will still be required for effective transfer.
Finally, both spouses already have freedom individually to "manage
and control" most forms of personal property, 59 subject to the limitation that community property may not be given away without the express or implied consent of the other spouse. 60 An attempt to create a
joint tenancy in such property will not give the acting spouse any
greater control over the property than he or she already has under the
61
management power.
In addition, a right to perfect a purported joint tenancy should not
enable the nonacting spouse to impair the interests of the acting
spouse. If the nonacting spouse is aware of the purported joint tenancy and uses the property as though it were separate property, the
62
tenancy will then be perfected under the doctrine of ratification.
Moreover, if the nonacting spouse were aware of the purported joint
tenancy, he or she could not unilaterally dispose of all the property
concerned because modern rules governing joint tenancy ownership
prohibit one tenant from consuming more than a proportionate
share. 6 3
58.
59.
60.
61.

WASH. REV. CODE § 26.16.030(3) (1976).
Id.
Id.
Any added danger of misconduct would result only if one spouse felt freer to

attempt to create a joint tenancy and then to use the property for personal purposes
than to use community assets for personal purposes in the absence of a purported

joint tenancy.
62.

See note 54 supra. The respondent in Olson argued summarily that Georgie

Olson ratified the joint tenancy by notifying Dorothy Linn that she intended to take
as survivor. Brief of Respondent at 8. Under the community property analysis, this
argument should have prevailed had not Victor Olson made the specific bequest of his

share of the assets represented by the note to Dorothy Linn. See notes 69-70 and accompanying text infra. Nevertheless, the fact that Georgie Olson deposited the pay-

ments on the note into the estate account of Victor Olson is inconsistent with her
stated intent to take as survivor.
63.

See Kauffman v. Kauffman, 60 Wn. 2d 1, 371 P.2d 535 (1962). In Kauffman,

the court declared that one joint tenant had no right to appropriate the entire account
for personal use, and added that the other joint tenant's "existing interest in the joint
account could not be terminated, revoked, or divested, without her consent." Id. at 11,
371 P.2d at 541. See also R. POWELL, REAL PROPERTY

605 (1977) (concerning

fiduciary duties of tenants in common). Imposing such restrictions on the use of joint
funds would lessen the disparity between the consequences of community ownership

569

Washington Law Review

Vol. 53: 557, 1978

Although the acting spouse may not acquire a right of survivorship
by unilaterally attempting to create a joint tenancy, it does not necessarily follow that the same act cannot create a right in the nonacting
spouse to perfect the tenancy which, if exercised, would enable that
spouse to take as survivor. The Washington Supreme Court has recognized that a joint tenancy might create a right of survivorship for only
one tenant. 64 Thus, if a bachelor and a married man become joint tenants and the latter deposits community funds into the joint account,
the bachelor's right of survivorship would be defeated by the superior
claims of the surviving spouse. The married man, however, enjoys a
full right of survivorship to the funds deposited by the bachelor. 65 A
similar inequality of rights should be established when one spouse has
attempted to convert community property into joint tenancy ownership so that the nonacting spouse can ratify and thereby perfect the
tenancy even after the death of the acting spouse.
Such an inequality of rights is compatible with the intent of the acting spouse. The court properly has protected one spouse from inadvertently relinquishing his or her right to bequeath one-half of the
proceeds of a community-owned life insurance policy. 66 The incidents
of joint tenancy ownership, however, make inadvertence unlikely. An
and joint ownership.
The court might also impose a special duty of disclosure if the joint tenants were
husband and wife. Cf. Friedlander v. Friedlander, 80 Wn. 2d 293, 494 P.2d 208 (1972)
(impossibility of arm's-length dealing creates a duty of full disclosure of financial
status prior to antenuptial contract).
64. In re Estate of Webb, 49 Wn. 2d 6, 297 P.2d 948 (1956).
65. Id. at 12-13, 297 P.2d at 952. The case holds only that the married man may
take as survivor. The rest is assumed arguendo by the court but is clearly consistent
with community property law. Arguably the surviving spouse has a superior claim to
only one half of the community property, although that was not the decision in Webb.
For example, the court in In re Estate of Towey, 22 Wn. 2d 212, 155 P.2d 273 (1945),
seemed to regard the right to dispose of half of the community property as an incident
of ownership. There, the husband was allowed to change the beneficiary of a life insurance policy purchased with community funds from his wife to the executor of his
estate and thereby dispose of half by will. The policy specifically allowed the change.
The court declared that if the husband could not change the beneficiary, "it would
follow that the policies of insurance were not community property in which the husband had an equal interest with his wife, but . . . were the separate property of the
wife, although purchased with funds of the community." ld. at 216, 155 P.2d at 276.
The court has recently extended this analysis to its logical conclusion in Francis v.
Francis, 89 Wn. 2d 511, 573 P.2d 369 (1978). Now one spouse has the right to name
a third party as beneficiary of half the proceeds generated by an insurance policy purchased with community funds even though the other spouse had previously been the
sole beneficiary. The court reasoned that this was a quasi-testamentary designation
and therefore the right to dispose of one half the community property by will should
be extended to permit substitution of beneficiaries. Id. at 515, 573 P.2d at 371.
66. See Francis v. Francis, 89 Wn. 2d 511, 573 P.2d 369 (1978).
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insurance policy purchased with community funds presumably is intended by both spouses to remain community property. 67 Creating a
joint tenancy, on the other hand, necessarily changes the form of ownership. It cannot be maintained, therefore, that the acting spouse expected to retain a right of testamentary disposition over the joint
tenancy property. The acting spouse, by attempting to create a joint
tenancy, has demonstrated an intent to relinquish his or her testamentary control over the property. Allowing the acting spouse thus to create a right of perfection in the nonacting spouse by relinquishing his
or her right of testamentary disposition does not conflict with Washington's community property scheme, given the analogous right of
each spouse independently to transfer community property interests
68
to the other.
Acknowledging the right of one spouse to perfect a purported joint
tenancy is, nevertheless, consistent with the result reached in Olson. A
joint tenancy purportedly created by the act of one spouse alone has a
tentative quality. Because the tenancy may be extinguished if the nonacting spouse refuses to participate, it should also be extinguished if
the acting spouse repudiates the purported creation. Either refusal or
repudiation prevents a court from finding the required concerted ac69
tion.
The result in Olson is proper because Victor Olson's specific bequest to Dorothy Linn constituted a repudiation.7 0 The testamentary
provision became effective on Victor Olson's death,7 1 at which time
67. Id. at 515-16, 573 P.2d at 371-72.
68. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 26.16.050 (1976) (giving each spouse the right
to convey community property interests in real property to the other). The right to
convert separate property into community property has been recognized by decisional
law. Volz v. Zang, 113 Wash. 378, 194 P. 409 (1920).
69. The purported creation of a joint tenancy is thus treated as a continuing expression of intent by the acting spouse to create such a tenancy. Later participation by
the nonacting spouse establishes mutual and, in a sense, contemporaneous agreement
between the spouses. Repudiation of intent by the acting spouse prevents the required
agreement. The closest analogy is to contract law. There, a standing offer has characteristics similar to those of a purported joint tenancy.
70. A residuary clause would not constitute a repudiation since it does not demonstrate any specific change of intent on the part of the acting spouse. Thus, the danger
of inadvertently leaving half of the purported joint tenancy property to a. residuary
taker does not exist under this analysis. See notes 51-52 and accompanying text supra.
71. An alternative rule would be that a specific bequest or devise would be an effective repudiation upon execution of the will. The concept of an ambulatory will
would suffer somewhat under this rule, but the concept has been modified in other
contexts without serious objection. For instance, a will revoking a prior will is effective for this purpose upon execution, because the destruction or revocation of the
second will does not revive the first. WASH. REV. CODE § 11.12.080 (1976). The alter-
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the purported joint tenancy ceased to have force. Nothing remained
for Georgie Olson to ratify; therefore, the tenancy was never perfected and she could not take as survivor.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The Olson decision is highly ambiguous. It is difficult, therefore, to
more than speculate about its reach. The ambiguity may be beneficial, however, because it leaves the court substantially free to avoid
the undesirable implications of the opinion. The court should consider the matter again, both to end the uncertainty and to initiate a
clear and consistent treatment of joint tenancies in Washington.
Meanwhile, as a matter of practice, the lawyer is well advised to have
all joint tenants, especially a husband and wife, sign the instrument of
creation, acknowledging their receipt as joint tenants. Nothing short
of a written transfer from all owners to themselves as joint tenants,
however, is completely safe from the reach of Olson.
Bruce Lamka

native rule would also make sense because it is the intent of the acting spouse, not
the formality of expression, which is at issue. For this same reason, repudiation should
be found whether or not the will is properly executed.
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